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ABSTRACT
Turkey's role as a regional power has increased since Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power. AKP leadership not only
aspired to become a regional power but also a global player. Turkey has, therefore, assumed different roles: the "natural leader" of the
region; a historical "big brother;" and the "protector" of the Muslim minorities. Turkey has also assumed a "mediator" and a "facilita-
tor" role by trying to negotiate a deal with an emerging power such as Brazil in order to attempt to resolve the controversial Iranian
nuclear issue. By making use of recent developments, Turkey tried to solidify its long desired role as a "rising power" by increasing its
influence in its neighborhood and engaging with other emerging powers. The concept "regional power" is a context-based notion. In
other words, the location and geography are contesting and disputed approaches. Notwithstanding the fact that concepts such as
"region" and "power" are social constructed reality, this paper analyzes the notion of 'regional power' as a subcategory of 'power'. In
this context, this paper will make use of Stefan Schim's criteria while analyzing Turkey's power capacity in the region. Schim posits
that the "regional power" needs to have a "role definition," and it should possess material power (hard power). It should also have
economic as well as diplomatic and organizational capacity. Its power whether it is 'soft power' (attraction of ones idea's and or the
ability to set the political agenda in a way that shapes the preferences of other actors) or 'hard power' (material power that can be
measured-economic and military power) needs to be acknowledged by other actors in the region. It should also be accepted by great
powers and emerging powers that are determinant in the international system. dditionally, the regional power (and/ or global power)
needs to have leverage, thus its power projection needs to yield results. Kalevi Holsti's role theory will be used as theoretical frame-
work to analyze foreign policy behavior of the AKP. The paper will, thus, seek to find out Turkey's roles.
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I. Introduction
Turkey's role as are regional power has increased since Justice and De-velopment Party (AKP) came to power. AKP leadership not only aspi-red to become a regional power but also a global player. Turkey has,
therefore, assumed different roles: the natural leader" of the region; a historical
big brother;" and the protector" of the Muslim minorities. Turkey has also as-
sumed a mediator" and a facilitator" role by trying to negotiate a deal with an
emerging power such as Brazil in order to attempt to resolve the controversial
Iranian nuclear issue. By making use of recent developments, Turkey tried to
solidify its long desired role as a rising power" by increasing its influence in its
neighborhood and engaging with other emerging powers. The concept regional
power" is a context-based notion. In other words, the location and geography
are contesting and disputed approaches (Bilgin 2004). Notwithstanding the
fact that concepts such as "region" and "power" are a social constructed reality,
this paper analyzes the notion of "regional power" as a subcategory of "po-
wer". In this context, this paper will make use of Stefan Schim's criteria while
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analyzing Turkey's power capacity in the region. Schrim (2010) posits that the
"regional power" needs to have a "role definition", and it should possess mate-
rial power (hard power), in addition to military power. It should also have
economic as well as diplomatic and organizational capacity. Its power, whet-
her it is 'soft power' (attraction of ones idea's and or the ability to set the politi-
cal agenda in a way that shapes the preferences of other actors) (Nye 1990)1 or
'hard power' (material power that can be measured-economic and military po-
wer) needs to be acknowledged by other actors in the region. It should also be
accepted by great powers and emerging powers that are determinant in the
international system. Additionally, the regional power (and/or global power)
needs to have leverage, thus its power projection needs to yield results (Schrim
2010). Kalevi Holsti's role theory2 will be used as theoretical framework to
analyze foreign policy behavior of the AKP. The paper will, thus, seek to find
out Turkey's roles.
Furthermore, the paper does not only focus on "Turkey's achievements in
economic issues, but also in its impacts on Turkish foreign policy. In the first
section, it will elaborate on Turkey's assumed roles and its foreign relations
with its neighbors and with emerging powers. Then, it will analyze its power
capacity in terms of its economic power, diplomatic power, and soft power.
This paper will not examine Turkey's military power because the main focus
of the paper will be on Turkey's 'economic potential' and 'soft power capacity'
as well as its 'diplomatic power'. In the second section, it will elaborate on
Turkish foreign policy and its engagement with other emerging states in two
sections: first, throughout the financial (global) crisis; second, after the politi-
cal crisis in Turkey (Gezi Park uprisings and power struggle with the Fetullah
Gulen movement).
II. Turkey's growing economy: Its impact of Turkish foreign policy
Turkey, in a little more than a decade ago, has gone from a financial crisis
to having one of the fastest growing economies in the world. Especially after
the global financial crisis, in 2008, Turkey aspired to seek global leadership
when great powers faced challenges in this new era. Emerging economies
such as the BRICS (five major emerging nations- Brazil, Russia, India, China,
South Africa) and the G-20 (Group of 20 major economies- Turkey is now in
G-20) have done much better during and after the global financial crisis. Du-
ring the global crisis, Turkey has been viewed as a rising (emerging) economic
power; and tried to act as a global player in international platforms. AKP lea-
dership has aspired to achieve its 2,023 goals, which is to become one of the
leading 10 economies in the world. Moreover, as "Turkey's AKP has provided
stability and vision", (Byrant & Hatay, p. 1) to the country, Turkey has been
revealed, by some circles the United States (U.S.), as a 'model' of democracy
for the Muslim world, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA). Notwithstanding its internal ups and downs in its own performance
in democracy lately seen in the jailing of hundreds of students, academics and
journalists since AKP came to power, Turkey is still being considered to be a
democratic country and an inspiration for other countries in the region.3
The development of infrastructure and institutions of governance, the ex-
plosive growth of its economy, as well as the combination of a religiously
conservative governing party and secular governance have made the "Turkish
model" a well-known rhetoric (Byrant & Hatay 2013, p. 1). Nevertheless, Me-
liha Altunısık, a prominent scholar in the Middle East Technical University in
1 See also Nye (2004, p. 11).
2 Role theory has its roots in the
sociology discipline and was first
used by sociologists to analyze
society's behavior. See also Kale-
vi Holsti (1970, p. 256).
3 OSCE's concerns regarding ar-
rested journalists in Turkey. It is
also not uncommon to punish
journalists with solitary confine-
ment for extended time periods
(see OSCE 2012). According to
the Turkish daily, Hurriyet, in
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Turkey, has stresses that a "Turkish model" rhetoric has been present since the
beginning of the Turkish Republic after the Turkish independence war, when
"unlike the other countries of the region, Turkey was born out of a determina-
tion not to accept the post-WW I settlement that was imposed on it by the
winners of the war" (Altunısık 2008, p. 200). Turkey's reforms and moderniza-
tion efforts, throughout the Mustafa Kemal Atatürk era, became a role model
or rather an inspiration for other Muslim countries such as Pakistan, Tunisia
and Iran (until the 1979 Islamic Revolution).
The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) expert Steven A. Cook asserted
that the Obama administration perceived Turkey, "not just as a geostrategic
asset, but as a potential partner" in the Mideast, especially after tremendous
change in the region.4 Nevertheless, if there was such a thing as the "Turkish
moment", it seems to have passed as hope in Arab countries has faded away.
Arab Spring left the ground to a "harsh and dark winter" instead of bringing
different colors to the region. The Arab Spring did not bloom, but has given
way to the hard realities of building democracy. It took centuries for the Euro-
pean countries to become democracies after the bloody French revolution. Sin-
ce 1923, Republic of Turkey is still striving to become a democratic country
and seems to have a long way to go. Civil society in Turkey is not strong and
effective. Turkey has not been able to build strong institutions like the Euro-
pean Union countries such as Germany, France and Britain. Thus, Turkey
could not move to a genuine liberal form of democracy, which led to the accu-
mulation of centralized power. Turkey's institutions and checks and balances
in the Turkish constitution are weakening.5 Nonetheless, the AKP leadership
has strived to assume a natural "leader" role in the region. This goal has also
had an impact on its foreign policy.
III. Turkey's assumed foreign policy roles and its relations with its neighbors and with emerging powers
Over the past decade, Turkish foreign policy has barely been on a rising
and steady curve. Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu's policy of
"zero problems" with Turkey's neighbors has turned into "zero partners". Tur-
key no longer has strategic partners or reliable allies due to its "uncertain fo-
reign policy." In the course of "unexpected circumstances" it has lost not only
its former allies' trust but also has lost regional ties with countries like Iraq,
Iran and Syria. For instance, Iran remains a threat (a nuclear threat if it acqui-
res nuclear weapons in the near future) because it has announced that it would
attack Turkey with its missiles if it was struck by Israeli or American forces.
Iran has made this public; right after Turkey signed the missile defense agree-
ment with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and placed the radar
system in Küreçik to NATO's use. Syria's civil war and Turkey's support to
the Sunni extremist opposition groups in Syria has worsened its relation with
not only Iran but also Syria as well as its former partners such as Israel and the
United States. Turkey's relation with Israel is not much better after Israeli Pri-
me Minister Netanyahu's apology to the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdogan on the Mavi Marmara incident.
On the other hand, Turkey has tried to develop its economic relations with
countries which it has historical links. Additionally, it has improved its rela-
tions with countries in parts of subsaharan Africa. For example, the number of
Turkish embassies in recent years in Africa has grown from 12 to 34 and it has
signed a number of trade agreements. Before the Arab Spring, in the late
2000s, the lifting of visa restrictions throughout the neighboring region was
August 2012, 2,824 students
were being held in Turkish pri-
sons, after having been arrested
since 31 January 2012 on charges
of "being a member of an armed-
terrorist organization" (Number
of students in jail hits 2,824 in
Turkey, 2012).
4 Interview with Steven A. Cook,
"Turkey's Rising Mideast Role,"
26 October 2011 (Cook, Sabbagh
& Gwetzman 2011).
5 Interview, Sinan Ulgen, expert
in Carnegie Endowment for Pea-
ce in Brussels, 18.Jan.2014.
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another example of "active foreign policy" that Davutoglu has pursued. New
markets have opened. This in turn, has enhanced Turkey's economic growth.
Turkish aid investment has increased, in the Muslim countries of north and
subsaharan Africa and particularly the Turkic countries of Central Asia. Tur-
kish Cooperation and Coordination Agency's (Türk Isbirligi ve Koordinasyon
Ajansı or TIKA) budget in 2011 was US$ 1.73 billion, which is not an insigni-
ficant figure when compared to the European Union Development Fund's bud-
get that is around 3.78 € billion (US$ 5 billion) available annually for its work
in non-EU or non-neighborhood development (EU Development Policy 2014).
The current map of the activities of the TIKA illustrates that of the 30 coun-
tries that have TIKA coordination offices only five are in countries without
noteworthy Muslim populations, namely Moldovia, Macedonia, Georgia, Uk-
raine and Kenya.
Turkey focused on improving its ties with the South Caucasus, Balkans and
Middle East. These are the regions where Turkey does the most business; and
engages in aid and development projects. According to the PRIO-TESEV re-
port, "neo-Ottoman" rhetoric is the most predominant strategy that shapes the
country's soft power politics in its neighborhood. Bülent Aras, director of the
Strategic Research Center in Ankara, the think-tank of the Turkish Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, argues that Turkey's new strategy is "to initiate a psychologi-
cal breakthrough in the Balkans "to undo the negative memories of the past".
(Aras 2012, p. 1) By doing so, Turkey tries to use its soft power to enhance its
economic relations with countries in the region. In this context, "the new Tur-
kish foreign policy is aimed at using this regional and historically based poli-
tics as a springboard to a global position". (Byrant & Hatay 2013, p. 3). On the
other hand, according to the International Strategic Research Organization
(USAK) report, Turkey still is not a regional leader because a regional leader
need to have not only material power resources such as economic, diplomatic
and organizational capacity, in addition to military power (Dinçer & Kutlay
2012). There is little doubt Turkey perceives itself as a model (Byrant & Hatay
2013, p. 3), but in the Middle East Turkey is perceived less as a model than as
an aspiration. Middle Eastern countries aspire to be like Turkey not because of
Turkey's political system but because of Turkey's economic success.
Turkey's soft power has been growing through its attractiveness to its
neighborhood since the AKP government came to power. Turkish products,
television, schools as well as development aid has increased its soft power.
Turkish universities are being established, while religious leader Fethullah
Gülen's (Gülen Cemaat) schools are mushrooming in South Caucasus, Central
Asia, and the Balkans. Turkish construction companies are rebuilding some
parts of Georgia. Additionally, Turkish big business is initiating new busines-
ses and opening factories in Bulgaria. Moreover, Turkish banks dominate the
finance sector in Bosnia. Furthermore, Turkish brands are flooding the markets
in Egypt, Iraq as well as formerly Syria. "Throughout the Balkans, South Cau-
casus, and Middle East, people watch Turkish movies and media, and Turkish
soap operas are popular throughout the Middle East, where they spread a vi-
sion of a Turkish way of life that is modern but Muslim". (Byrant & Hatay
2013, p. 18).
Turkey has assumed different foreign policy roles as: "natural leader" of
the region; a historical "big brother;" and "the protector" of the Muslim mino-
rities. Thus, by assuming such roles Turkey tried to solidify its long desired
role as a "rising power" by increasing its influence in its neighborhood and
engaging with other emerging powers. Turkey's new foreign policy has also
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been called "neo-Ottomanism" (AKP's aspiration to go back to the Ottoman
era) by various circles in both Europe and the United States. Turkey's particu-
lar interest in those countries of the former Ottoman sphere, with which it
believes itself to have historical and cultural ties, has been questioned. Moreo-
ver, it is argued that it has undertaken a historical role as a leader of the Mus-
lim. The course the AKP government is taken has been puzzling. Foreign
Minister Davutoglu rejects the neo-Ottoman label;6 there seems little doubt
that the AKP leadership perceives Turkey to be a "natural" leader of the re-
gion. AKP parliamentarians have expressed this aspiration. Fehmi Kinay, who
has been an AKP parliamentarian since 2002, has suggested that Prime Minis-
ter Tayyip Erdrogan could unite the Sunni sects.7
Prime Minister Erdogan's also seems to assume a role as the Muslim lea-
der. Turkey assumes the "protector" and "big brother" role; punishes when it
considers necessary and aids the weak Muslim countries and (extremist) Sunni
groups (Byrant & Hatay 2013, p. 2). For instance, Prime Minister Erdogan's
support to extremist Sunni Muslim groups in Syria and also its visit to Libya,
in 2011, and his relation with the leader of the National Transitional Council
was considered to be an act that illustrated his will to be a Halife (Muslim
leader) in the MENA. Another example to this argument has been Turkey's
aid to Somalia. This policy was perceived as a "geo-strategic vision." It was
argued that Turkey was seeking new allies. "The discourse of common Islamic
values underpins Turkey's engagement in Africa, emphasizing its normative
foundation" (Aynte 2012). Hence, AKP leadership assumes a role that entails
setting an example for the counties in the region.
On the other hand, it can also be argued that Turkey's new foreign policy
has enhanced its economic growth. This is founded on a vision of Turkey as
regional leader. The AKP leadership perceives itself as having not only the
responsibility but also the power to act. Even though Turkey's Western allies,
both the U.S. and the European Union (EU) are skeptical about Turkey poli-
cies both in domestic politics and foreign policies, AKP leadership does not
pay any attention to the critics and it is willing to assume a leadership role.
This new role can be observed in many incidents: Erdogan's reaction at Davos
to Shimon Peres; Turkey's disapproval of the Israeli response to the Mavi Mar-
mara flotilla aiming to breach the Gaza barricade; AKP's support to Hamas; its
aid to extremist groups in Syria. All these can be considered signs of a country
that perceives itself as a "Muslim leader". This motive led to AKP leadership
to engage in building new relationship with not only countries in its neighbor-
hood but also engaging in emerging powers such as Brazil and China. Turkey,
thus, turned its back to its former Western allies. But the so-called Gezi Park
uprising and the power struggle between Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan
(Menzili Tarikat) and religious leader Fetullah Gülen (Gülen Cemaat) in Tur-
key have changed not only Turkey's power capacity but its diplomatic power
and soft power. Both events have decreased both its soft power and diplomatic
power in the region.
IV. Turkey's power capacity before and after Gezi Park Protests: diplomatic power and soft power in the
neighborhood and Turkey's engagement with emerging powers
Gezi Park uprising in Turkey was a remarkable development in history of
Turkey. People occupied public spaces and tried to reach out to the govern-
ment with slogans, which contained hummer in it. But the government did not
react to it in a constructive way as in Brazil (where there were protests appro-
6 "I am not a neo-Ottoman, Da-
vutoglu says" (2009). See also:
"DAVUTOGLU'NUN HAYALI
Osmanlı Milletler Toplulugu"
(2010); "Ahmet Davutoglu: 12
yıl içinde cihan devleti olacagız"
(2011); Ortaylı (2011).
7 Interview, Fehmi Kinay, AKP
Parliamentarian, 8 January 2014.
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ximately at the same time). The protests began when a group of people started
the Taksim Solidarity (Taksim Dayanısması) due to environmental concerns.
They intended to save hundreads of trees at Gezi Park and "halt an urban deve-
lopment project to rebuild the historical Ottoman barracks..." (Yayla 2013).
The group, before long, occupied the park and built tents to demonstrate their
concern. This movement grew further and high school and university students
joined the passive protests. But on May 31st, 2013 the authorities attempted to
forcefully evacuate the park through extensive use of pepper gas, which resul-
ted in clashes and injuries. The AKP government's rhetoric of freedom and
democracy was questioned because these events clearly demonstrated that it
lacked substance at home.
The Gezi Park uprisings "surpassed their local and national appeal and,
before long, attracted global interest". (ibidem). Among the Arab nations this
was seen as a sign that the AKP government was not a democratic country and
Turkey was no longer viewed as an inspiration to other Arab countries. Not
only the Gezi Park protests but also the power struggle between the AKP lea-
dership and Fethullah Gülen has created doubts about Turkey's democratic and
secular regime. "The movement of charismatic cleric, Fethullah Gülen, having
a strong hold on Turkish politics and social life", (Byrant & Hatay 2013, p. 14)
has disturbed Prime Minister Erdogan and he has decided to close down the
Gülen's schools. Gülen's schools and universities were opening branches
abroad and in Turkey and this was one of the soft powers of Turkey in its
neighborhood. "Turkey's role as a stabilizing force may be undermined by the
current government's Islamist leanings and ties". (ibidem). On the other hand,
Turkey's role as "protector" of Muslim minorities in South Caucasus and the
Balkans are also viewed to be in conflict with its foreign policy interests. Ad-
ditionally, in the post-Arab Spring Middle East some groups such as Salafi and
Shia's are concerned about Turkey's role as a "big brother" trying to provide a
"role model" to the Arab countries. Especially, the Salafi in Saudi Arabia, the
secularist in Egypt and the Shia regime in Iran brought this event to the agen-
da.8 According to some circles in Europe, "Turkey's rhetoric of democracy
contrasts with failures of democracy at home". (Byrant & Hatay 2013, p. 17).
AKP leadership has been much less successful at encouraging and protecting
democratic values at home. Therefore, Turkey's soft power has declined gra-
dually. The efforts of AKP leadership to assume a role as a "natural leader"
and a "rising power" came to nowhere. So the efforts to increase Turkish influ-
ence and presence in the South Caucasus, Balkans and Middle Eastfailed.
On the other hand, in the global context, AKP government called the rede-
finition of the role of the United Nations (UN) and particularly the UN Securi-
ty Council. This call has been the "key planks in Turkey's attempts to leverage
itself into a global role". It attempted to play an active role as a facilitator and
mediator during the negotiations with Iran side by side with Brazil, which is
considered to be an emerging power in the new global order. According to the
recent report from the Center for a New American Security Turkey as well as
Brazil, India and Indonesia are considered to be "swing states" (those states
whose alliances have still not been determined). In the new regional order,
these countries should be molded into a significant regional broker by the U.S.
and EU. The polarities of power are ambiguous in this new international order
since U.S. is "exhausted by security wars and an EU struggling with financial
crisis". (Kliman & Fontaine 2013, p. 8). Not only the ambitions and interests
of Brazil, Russia and China needs to be considered but also the aspirations of
other "intermediate states" (Turkey can be named as intermediate state),9 with
8 Interview with Eyüp Ersoy,
USAK expert in Middle East,
2.Mar.2014.
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regional influence and wide scope, needs to be calculated. Brazil, India and
South Africa can be considered as "intermediate states", which are regional
powers (Hurrell 2006).
These states have some capacity for effective international action. Additio-
nally, they seem to possess a considerable range of economic and political
power resources. This gives them the ability to contribute to the making of
international order in the regional and global levels. They also believe that
they should have a more influential role in international politics and search for
recognition in multiple ways, such as the struggle for recognition of regional
spheres of influence and the criticism of asymmetries. They can also use inter-
national cooperation – sometimes in the form of international institutions – to
signal reassurance to weaker states, particularly within their regions, and tame
great powers through established rules and procedures. Besides having "voice
opportunities" to make known their interests and bid for political support, tho-
se states see in international cooperation political spaces to build new coali-
tions in order to change norms in ways that are more compatible with their
interests and balance policies of the most powerful.
Intermediate states' such as Turkey and Brazil that have limited material
capabilities and leverage comparatively to great power; they value collective
action and multilateral forums with 'like-minded' partners in similar stance so
as to influence international outcomes. Notwithstanding the fact that Turkey
and Brazil's leverage changes a lot from year to year, Turkey and Brazil will
remain an extremely important 'player' in the geopolitical and economic affairs
of the Middle East as well as the broader Mediterranean. Turkey, just as Bra-
zil, wants to have an impact on global politics. Therefore, it tried to be part of
the solution in the disputes that persist for years in the broader Middle East and
the Mediterranean. First and foremost, Turkey increased its trade and business
relations with Arab states including Iran. Second, it improved its relations with
its neighbors by lifting visa restrictions. Third, it assisted to facilitate and even
mediate some of the region's most disputed issues, trying to broker talks bet-
ween Iran and the international community, Pakistan and Afghanistan, Syria
and Israel as well as Fatah and Hamas.
To date, the Turkish government has not only deteriorated its relations with
not only Syria, but also with Iran owing to its support to the Sunni opposition
groups. Moreover, it did not hesitate to "burned his bridges with the military
regime in Egypt, squabbled with Gulf monarchies for refusing to stand by de-
posed Egyptian President Mohamed Morsy, and started a war of words with
Israel for having a hand in the coup that removed Morsy from power". (Aras
2013). Turkey has lost leverage everywhere in the world due to the Syrian
crisis, its relations with its neighbors, and Gezi Park uprisings in Turkey. On
the contrary, Turkey has indeed evolved over time. Its economic dynamism
and geopolitical importance cannot be disregarded. As a result of its "growing
economic diversification and military self-reliance allows Turkey to exercise
greater leverage with the West". (Metais 2013).
On the other hand, Brazil has got leverage over some powers and can influ-
ence world issues. Brazil's Roberto Azevedo has been selected the head of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) as a result of this it is expected that his
leadership will remove barriers 'as part of global trade talks' due to its influen-
ce over the 'BRICS' that is composed of five member states, namely Brazil,
Russia, India, China and South Africa. Foreign Minister Antonio Patriota
maintains that this "reflects the transformation underway in the global order".
9 Lima (2005) indicates that an
"intermediate state" generally in-
cludes at least one of three ele-
ments: intermediate material ca-
pabilities, a certain level of self-
perception and the recognition of
this international status by other
states, especially great powers.
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(Zalewski 2013). Brazil has the ability to convince and persuade actors to en-
gage because Brazil is more sensitive to other actors' preferences and it has the
ability to present arguments and ideas in an effective manner.
Moreover, Turkey has engaged with other emerging powers, namely Chi-
na, Russia and Japan. Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan's decision to
purchase Chinese missile system (CPMEIC's HQ system) over the U.S. Pa-
triots has created more concern over Turkey's intentions (False Friends: Why
US is getting tough with Turkey 2013). In 2012, the strategic relationship bet-
ween China and Turkey had taken off with Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping's
visit to Turkey in February, later Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan's visit to
China in April a few months later. The relationship between the two nations
entered a "honeymoon" phase. (China, Turkey to Establish Strategic Coopera-
tive Relationship 2010). Turkey has steadily increased its trade with China
since the AKP government came to power. Turkish trade with China has in-
creased; exports to China amounted to $1.43 billion in 2008, and Turkey's
imports from China were $15.6 billion in the same year (Turkey-China Trade
Relations Weaken as Crisis Hits 2009). The two countries' closer relationship
not only in the fields of trade but also culture, tourism, as well as the military
has signaled its willingness to engage with emerging powers. According to
Tao Zan, "Turkey's acceptance as a "dialogue partner" in the Shanghai Coope-
ration Organization is not necessarily leading to the establishment of a sub-
stantial strategic relationship, though leaders of both countries have spoken of
such a partnership since 2010. Rather, Turkey's turn to the East is not a strate-
gic shift, but is a way of keeping a balance between the West and the East. Due
to its substantial needs that the West can provide, from security to technology,
Turkey is still anchored in the West". (Zan 2013). Center for Global Moderni-
zation Studies scholar also argues that "Turkey, China is a potential partner but
not an alternative partner to the West". (idem). Nevertheless, it is important to
bear in mind that Turkey has engaged with many emerging powers since AKP
came to power and this is sign that AKP wants to engage with new allies and
acts careless towards its former allies concerns. Turkey has also signed a deal
with Russia in order to build its first nuclear facility on Turkish territory. Then,
Turkey has signed another deal with Japan to construct another nuclear facili-
ty. But Turkey had lost the trust of its "strategic partners" or "reliable allies"
due to its uncertain foreign policy. All these new foreign policy decisions have
created doubts about AKP leaderships' intentions.
V. Conclusions
"Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has called for a "new glo-
bal order" based on solidarity and trust rather than conflict. In practice, howe-
ver, Turkey has yet to settle on any definitive vision for that new order beyond
expanded representation in key forums". (Byrant & Hatay 2013, p. 8). Turkey
has puzzled countries by its uncertain foreign policy and most of its former
Western allies have lost trust in Turkey. Davutoglu had proposed an ambitious
program before the uprisings but afterwards his ambition faded away gradually
with the unexpected events especially in Egypt and Syria. AKP's foreign poli-
cy, especially after the 'Arab Spring' or rather 'Dark Arab Winter' has been low
key. Nur Bilge Criss has stressed that "priorities may always have to be re-
directed under changing junctures, but AKP does not seem to have priorities.
[...] AKP is merely trying to score points in foreign policy through populism".
(Criss 2010, p. 10). The only priority AKP seems to have is to stay in power
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and consequently change the regime in Turkey. The 2023 vision (AK Party
2012) of the government is to become one of the emerging powers and seek to
be almighty as the Ottoman Empire. AKP identify themselves as the "conser-
vative-democratic" mass party and their ideology has its roots in Islam, which
was influential in Turkish-Iranian rapprochement. Supporters of AKP also
have played a role in maintaining the relatively positive relations between Iran
and Turkey. Business associations such as the Independent Industrialists' and
Businessmen's Association (MUSIAD) has particularly been active in impro-
ving economic ties with Iran even though there was an UN embargo on Iran.
Turkey has also initiated a nuclear program and signed a contract with China
to buy a missile defense system. This move has confused NATO member sta-
tes and the U.S. has lost trust in Turkey's partnership (False Friends: Why US
is getting tough with Turkey 2014).
Turkey's political cooperation with Iran can also be elucidated by its eco-
nomic interests. Turkey's effort to avoid sanctions on Iran can be understood as
a result of its dependence on Iran's gas resources. The main reason behind
Turkey's objections to sanctions on Iran is due to protect new business. Similar
to Brazil, the reciprocal viewpoint between Turkey and Iran as partners was
based not only on economic objectives, but also in their political aspirations.
All partners aimed to attain more engagement in international institutions that
set the norms and values, where developing countries could have a voice. Both
Turkey and Brazil argued that the political isolation of Iran would only radica-
lize its position. In this regard, they renowned the 2009 elections of Iran as a
valid development of the democratic process, by congratulating the former
President Ahmadinejad straight after the elections.
The international image of Turkey similar to Brazil was viewed as an inter-
mediate power in the light of its 'soft power', (Tarik 2007) its abilities to per-
suade and assume a mediation role as a regional power since Turkey's AKP
came to power. For instance, AKP attempted to seem as credible regional po-
wer by making believe it is a democracy. The internalization of a foreign poli-
cy driven by economy (economic interdependence) rather than national
security increased the legitimacy of its role as an intermediate power. Additio-
nally, Turkey participated actively in the main economic and political forums
as well as regional and multilateral cooperation agreements. Turkey through its
active foreign policy(Davutogly 2013), could make use of multilateral forums
with states of similar capabilities and common interests so as to influence in-
ternational outcomes. Despite its limited capabilities and recourses compared
to great powers, Turkey akin to Brazil, demonstrated its readiness to expand its
role and liability with the intensification of regional as well as global politics.
Turkey and Brazil has quite similar ambitions given that they profile themsel-
ves as 'order-setter' intermediate powers.
Turkey is seeking to build new alliances with emerging powers in the
BRICS. It is trying to improve its relations with countries like Brazil; those
states that have ambition to play a global role and change the global order.
Both countries' objective is "at launching a new era in political and economic
fields". In line with their mutual goals the two countries also aim to strengthen
their cooperation in not only the economic field but also in the defense indus-
try. (Turkey. Ministry of Foreign Affairs s.d.).
All these new foreign policy decisions have created doubts about AKP lea-
derships' intentions. Particularly, a military deal with China has worried the
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NATO member states since Turkey is a NATO member and has signed the
NATO missile defense deal.
Aylin Gürzel (aygurzel@gmail.com) é PhD em Relações Internacionais pela Bilkent University (Turquia) e professora do
Departamento de Relações Internacionais da Eastern Mediterranean University (Turquia).
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RESUMO
O papel da Turquia como uma potência regional ampliou-se desde que o Partido da Justiça e do Desenvolvimento (AKP) chegou ao
poder. A liderança do AKP aspirava não apenas à posição da Turquia como potência regional, mas também à posição de uma
potência global. Assim, a Turquia assumiu diferentes papeis: o "líder natural" da região; um "grande irmão" histórico e o "protetor"
das minorias islâmicas. A Turquia também assumiu o papel de mediadora e de facilitadora ao tentar negociar um acordo em parce-
ria com uma potência emergente como o Brasil a fim de buscar resolver a controversa questão nuclear iraniana. Utilizando-se de
desenvolvimentos recentes, a Turquia tentou solidificar seu papel há muito tempo desejado de "potência em ascensão" ao ampliar
sua influência na sua vizinhança e se engajar com outras potências emergentes. O conceito de "potência regional" é uma noção
baseada no contexto. Em outras palavras, a localização e a geografia são perspectivas contestáveis e disputadas. Considerando o fato
de que conceitos como "região" e "potência" são realidades socialmente construídas, esse artigo analisa a noção de "potência regi-
onal" como uma subcategoria de "potência". O artigo fará uso dos critérios desenvolvidos por Stefan Schim ao analisar a capacidade
de projeção de poder da Turquia na região. Schim coloca que uma potência regional precisa ter uma "definição de papel" e deve ter
poder material (poder bruto). Ela também deve ter capacidades econômicas bem como diplomáticas e organizacionais. Seu poder -
seja o brando (atração pelas ideias e/ou a habilidade de definir a agenda política de forma a moldar as preferências de outros atores)
ou o bruto (poder material que pode ser medido, como o econômico e o militar) - precisa ser reconhecido pelos outros atores na
região. Ela também deve ser aceita pelas grandes potências e potências emergentes que são determinantes no sistema internacional.
Ademais, a potência regional (e/ou a potência global) deve ter alavancagem; assim, sua projeção de poder precisa produzir resulta-
dos. A teoria de papeis de Kalevi Holsti será utilizada como o marco teórico de referência para a análise do comportamento de
política externa do AKP. Este artigo buscará apontar os papeis assumidos pela Turquia.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Turquia; AKP; Estados emergentes; potência regional; poder material.
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